Do experts hurt or bene…t the average voter? We examine this question in a model of electoral competition where voters have state-contingent, single peaked policy preferences, political parties compete for o¢ ce rents by committing to policy platforms, and an expert with preferences di¤erent from the median voter tries to manipulate platform choices as well as ballot choices through cheap talk messages about the state-of-the-world, of which she is privately informed. By itself, partisan endorsement-a recommendation to voters regarding which platform to vote for-makes a majority worse o¤, while policy advocacy-a message about the intrinsic merits of di¤erent policies aimed at in ‡uencing platforms-makes all voters better o¤. In conjunction, endorsements and advocacy generate higher welfare than either form of communication alone, and o¢ ce seeking politicians serve the public interest better than decision makers who are motivated by the public interest per se. The key insight is that electoral competition can produce de facto quasi delegation of decision making power to biased experts, making policy choices distorted but also more informed.
Introduction
Democratic decision making in modern societies increasingly relies on critical scienti…c input. The following questions are instantly recognizable from contemporary policy debates. Is there anthropogenic global warming? If so, how large an economic cost should we bear to reduce carbon emissions? Are genetically modi…ed foods safe to eat? Does austerity prolong a recession or does it revive economies by restoring …scal health? Are self driving cars safe? Is net neutrality necessary?
These kinds of questions are central to the design of environmental policy, food and drugs regulation, business cycle management, technology policy and international relations. Voters and politicians must turn to a small minority of specially trained experts to learn the answers. Yet, incorporating expert advice into policy making is not straightforward because experts are often perceived as biased. Scientists who certify GM foods as safe are accused of being funded by large agribusiness companies. Climate scientists who warn of climate change do not face the economic burden of abatement the way coal miners and steel workers do. Advocates of austerity are thought to have other right wing goals such as keeping government small or resisting redistribution. When most economists warned that there will be signi…cant economic costs of Britain leaving the European Union, Michael Gove, a Tory politician campaigning for 'Brexit' famously said, "People in this country have had enough of experts."
Optimal policy is usually a function of both objective information and subjective preferences.
When the expert's preferences are known to be di¤erent from that of the average member of the public (perhaps due to di¤erences in economic interest or ideology), the public and the expert would disagree as to what the best policy is even under symmetric information. In processing expert advice under asymmetric information, the public and the politicians face a signal extraction problem -to what extent is the advice derived from the expert's scienti…c knowledge and to what extent is it shaped by her non-scienti…c preferences or values?
This paper studies how representative democracy is a¤ected by expert opinion in the presence of such credibility constraints. We present a simple Downsian model in which policy outcomes result from the interaction between three sets of actors: voters, o¢ ce seeking politicians and an expert.
Voters and the expert have state-contingent single peaked preferences, with only the expert privately informed about the 'state-of-the-world.' Competing politicians commit to policy platforms in order to maximize their chances of getting elected. The expert may communicate her private information through public cheap talk messages throughout the electoral process, before and/or after platforms are chosen. The model combines in a natural way two canonical frameworks of economic theory: the Hotelling (1929) model of spatial competition and the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of strategic communication between an informed but biased expert and an uninformed decision maker.
What is the value of an expert in such a setting? To the extent policy choices incorporate the expert's information, she serves the public interest. To the extent they are in ‡uenced by her preference bias, she may impose harm on the average voter. How these two forces will play out is the central concern of the paper. Since policies are not directly chosen by the voter but mediated by third parties (politicians) with their own motives, Blackwell's theorem cannot be invoked to infer that the value of experts in a democracy must be non-negative.
The expert's information can be incorporated into policies through two potential channels: (a) the expert enables political parties to make informed platform choices by credibly revealing some relevant scienti…c information in the pre-electoral stage (what we call policy advocacy) (b) platform divergence among parties creates genuine choice for voters and the expert helps them elect the more suitable platform at the voting stage (what we call partisan endorsement). As it turns out, voter welfare critically depends on which form(s) of communication the expert can engage in.
First, consider the case where the expert can only issue partisan endorsements. The …rst channel is then shut down by assumption. Due to usual reasons that arise in spatial voting, equilibrium platforms must converge, endogenously foreclosing the second channel too. The policy outcome in the model becomes completely insensitive to the expert's information in this scenario. However, since the expert's endorsement can in ‡uence electoral outcomes for o¤ -the-equilibriumpath platform choices, this convergence happens not at the expected ideal point of the median voter but closer to the expected ideal point of the expert. The median voter (and by extension a majority of voters) reaps no informational advantage from the expert's presence but su¤ers a loss in welfare due to the break down of the median voter theorem. Experts are a democratic liability if their engagement with public policy is purely partisan and short term, comprising of nothing more than political endorsements during campaign season.
Interestingly, the magnitude of platform distortion is related to the expert's bias in a nonmonotonic fashion. For a given level of uncertainty about the underlying state, maximum distortion is caused by moderately biased experts. Extremely biased experts have little or no in ‡uence on platforms because their endorsements are more indicative of their bias than their information.
Suppose, on the contrary, the expert cannot do endorsements but can engage in policy advocacy, i.e., express opinions about the merits of alternative policies before election campaigns are launched.
Since there is no last minute partisan endorsement to in ‡uence voter choice, equilibrium platforms will always converge to the policy that is optimal for the median voter conditional on the expert's policy message. The outcome in this scenario is as if the expert is playing the standard Crawford-Sobel (1982) game with the median voter, where the latter always chooses her expected utility maximizing policy following the expert's recommendations. This induces the familiar partitioning of the state space in equilibrium, with increased coarsening of information in the direction of the expert's bias. Since platforms maximize the median voter's expected payo¤ conditional on available information, it follows that the expert's presence can only be welfare enhancing for the median voter, and strictly so when the game has a non-babbling equilibrium.
The timing of the expert's communication-whether pre-campaign and aimed at in ‡uencing platforms, or pre-election and aimed at in ‡uencing voters'ballot choices-has dramatically opposite e¤ects on voter welfare, therefore. The natural question is what happens when experts practice both advocacy and endorsements. The key result of the paper is that in all interesting cases, there is a synergy between the two forms of communication. The median voter is better o¤ when the expert practices both policy advocacy and partisan endorsements, rather than just one or the other. In particular, while the endorsement reduces welfare in itself by distorting platforms, in conjunction with policy advocacy, it actually raises voter payo¤s beyond what policy advocacy alone could achieve.
The key intuition behind this result is related to the delegation literature for cheap talk games (Holmstrom (1984) , Dessein (2002) ). An uninformed decision maker, in deciding whether to delegate decision making to an informed but biased advisor, faces a trade-o¤ between tolerating distorted choices (in the case of delegation) versus less informed choices (when relying on cheap talk advice). For small biases of the advisor, the trade-o¤ is resolved in favor of delegation. A similar force is at play here. The expert assumes de facto decision making power through her ability to pull electoral outcomes towards her preferred policies using her endorsements, which incentivizes her to reveal more information before campaigns rather than withholding information to manipulate choices. The median voter is better o¤ gaining information at the cost of policy distortion.
The delegation like quality of political competition under expert in ‡uence is however limited and does not lead to full revelation with policies …ne tuned to the underlying state-of-the-world.
The ability of the expert to manipulate platforms in the direction of her bias depends on su¢cient residual uncertainty in voters'minds at the electoral stage after platforms have been chosen.
Experts will therefore reveal information subject to retaining this in ‡uence. As a result, policy advocacy combined with endorsements reveals coarse information and leads to a partitioning of the state space, albeit a …ner and more uniform partition relative to policy advocacy alone.
This de facto delegation property of electoral competition is further illustrated in an extension of the model where experts are endowed not just with the power of making public statements but are assumed to dictate the platform choice of one party to promote their policy objectives. We
show that under such direct, albeit partial, capture of the democratic process by experts, average voter welfare is even higher. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium where the optimal mechanism (Holmstrom (1984), Goltsman et al. (2009)) from the median voter's perspective is replicated through electoral competition. This optimal mechanism takes the form of capped delegation, i.e., the expert's preferred policy is chosen in equilibrium subject to an upper (lower) bound if the expert has an upward (downward) bias.
Several broad lessons emerge from our analysis. First, for expertise to improve democratic outcomes, it is necessary that experts have a long term engagement with the political process and public debate, conveying their opinion about the intrinsic merits of di¤erent policies and shaping the political agenda before elections, not merely throwing their support behind particular parties and candidates.
Second, the institution of representative government formed by narrowly o¢ ce seeking parties plays an important commitment role in aggregating policy relevant information. These parties distort platforms and pander to experts to win their endorsement, but in the process, incentivize those biased experts to reveal more information ex ante. If policies were chosen by a utilitarian social planner, parties motivated by the public interest rather than electoral prospects, or some form of direct democracy, the slant of policies towards the expert's bias would be absent, as would the consequent gain in information, leading to lower welfare for most voters.
This commitment role of representative democracy arises from the inability of the expert to commit to revealing her information truthfully. Since imperfect information transmission also hurts the expert, the expert would like to commit to revealing all her information when policies are chosen in the public interest. Such incentives for full revelation are weaker under representative democracy, exactly because political parties choose policies that serve the expert's ideological interests to a greater extent.
Finally, it is important even in representative democracies that parties are able to commit to speci…c policy platforms rather than commit merely to a policy stance by nominating a candidate with the appropriate preference. In the latter case, electoral competition leads to convergence on candidates who share the median voter's preference, and who will therefore not pander to experts and elicit more information from them. Programmatic politics dominates personality centred politics in our framework.
Our paper is broadly related to a theoretical literature on media bias which examines selective or distorted presentation of information to the voting public. The media, like the expert in our framework, is assumed to have an informational advantaged over the public, which can be leveraged for pro…t or in ‡uence. One set of papers investigates the causes rather than consequences of information suppression, asking why it may not be in the interest of pro…t maximizing information providers to supply the best available information (Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) , Baron (2006) , Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) , Burke (2008), Besley and Prat (2006) , Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn (2008) and Anderson and McLaren (2012) ). Unlike a disinterested commercial media assumed in these papers, the expert in our model has an intrinsic motivation to manipulate policy choices.
More pertinently, our focus is on how biased information shapes platforms, policy outcomes and voter welfare, i.e., its electoral consequences.
Other papers on media bias endogenize electoral competition and …nd that biased information providers can have policy in ‡uence and welfare implications even if their bias is common knowledge.
In some papers, the conclusion rests on the assumption that the informed manipulator can restrict her message to a subset of voters (Grossman and Helpman (1999) , Stromberg (2004) , Chan and Suen (2008) ). In others, voting behavior (Andina-Diaz (2004)) or media strategy (Carrilo and Castanheinra (2008) ) is exogenously given and not derived from purposive, strategic considerations. Wittman (1983) , Calvert (1985) , and Gul and Pesendorfer (2011) di¤er from our paper in terms of both assumptions and conclusions. These papers assume policy motivated parties or candidates as opposed to o¢ ce motivated ones, and the departure from the median voter theorem takes the form of platform divergence rather than convergence of platforms to a policy that does not maximize the median voter's utility.
Finally, there is a literature on candidate valence, which may be a source of asymmetric information and electoral manipulation but of a fundamentally di¤erent kind. In our framework, voters do not know their policy preference since it is state-contingent. In the valence literature, voters have deterministic preference over policies but also care about a second dimension-the ability or character of elected candidates. Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002) examine policy outcomes when one candidate has a known valence advantage, while Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) look at asymmetric information. In particular, the results in Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) suggest that private information about valence can give substantial manipulative powers to the media or expert that can reduce voter welfare. The message of this paper is that private information on policy can lead to manipulation but the welfare e¤ect on the average voter is generally positive if communication possibilities are rich enough.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section ??
we characterize the e¤ect of partisan endorsements and policy advocacy on electoral competition. Section 2.3 compares voter welfare across alternative institutional arrangements and commitment assumptions. Section ?? reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 contains our concluding remarks.
All proofs are in the Appendix. The expert can publicly communicate with the electorate and with the parties via cheap talk.
A model of indirect capture
We allow for two stages of communication. The …rst stage of communication takes place before the parties have made their platform choices. We call this the policy advocacy stage and denote the expert's message at this stage by m a . 2 The message m a may contain information about the state y and in ‡uence the platform choices of the parties and the subsequent voting behavior of the electorate.
The second stage of communication takes place after the parties have committed to their platforms but before voters vote. We call this the platform endorsement stage and denote the corresponding message by m e . Since m e arrives after parties have committed to platforms, endorsements can only a¤ect the behavior of voters (although anticipated future endorsements can a¤ect platforms). In the …nal stage of the game, each voter votes in favor of her preferred platform after taking into account all available information. The party that wins a majority of votes is elected and implements its platform. Ties in votes are resolved uniformly. Figure 1 describes our timing structure.
This simple model of electoral competition among two o¢ ce seeking parties di¤ers from the canonical Hotelling-Downs framework in two ways. First, we introduce an uncertain state of the world that is relevant to determine the ideal policies of all voters. Second, we suppose that one particular voter, the expert, is privately informed about this state. The expert only uses public communication to in ‡uence the electoral process but does not directly control any other aspect of the elections. For this reason, we call this a model of indirect capture, to contrast with the direct Equilibria are identical to the classical Hoteling-Downs model without an informed voter and both parties located at the expected ideal policy of the median voter. 2 As is standard in cheap talk games, messages have no intrinsic cost or bene…t associated with them or even any meaning. Rather meaning is derived in equilibrium after taking into account incentives. We assume that the underlying message space is rich enough so that information transmission is constrained only by incentives and not the availability of messages.
capture of one or more political parties or any other institution. 3 While we model the expert as a single agent, this assumption should not be taken literally.
The expert in our model represents a particular interest group, such as the scienti…c community or an elite who have an informational advantage over the average voter and are able to exploit this advantage because of their access to scienti…c journals and media outlets. A common theme heard both from the left and the right about the functioning of modern democracies is that its proper operation is distorted by the concerted actions of an ideologically biased elite. Our formulation allows us to evaluate this kind of critique in its bleakest form. 4 We proceed by …rst characterizing equilibrium behavior in the platform endorsement stage, 
be the midpoint of the platforms. If x L = x R , the expert's second message cannot a¤ect voting behavior and each party wins the election with probability 1=2. Other- 3 We consider a version of such direct capture later in the paper. 4 As we show, even with a monopolist expert, the overall welfare e¤ect of indirect capture is quite bene…cial for voters because the electoral process results in signi…cant information revelation. With multiple ideologically distinct and competing groups of experts, this information revelation e¤ect should only be enhanced (see, e.g., Krishna and Morgan (2001) ). In this sense we look at the worst case scenario from the perspective of average voter welfare. 5 We show later that in any pure strategy equilibrium, the expert partitions the state space into intervals at the policy advocacy stage so that voter beliefs in the endorsement stage must always take this form.
wise, whenever E[yjm e ] > x mid , the median voter strictly prefers the right platform and whenever E[yjm e ] < x mid , the median voter strictly prefers the left platform.
The following two lemmas are straightforward and they prove useful in characterizing equilibrium behavior in the endorsement stage. The …rst says the median voter is decisive for the electoral outcome. The second says the expert's endorsement must re ‡ect her true preference. It also identi…es conditions under which the expert is in ‡uential (i.e., her endorsement a¤ects voting outcomes).
When the median voter strictly prefers one platform, that platform is elected.
Since voters have single-crossing single-peaked preferences and identical information, if the median voter strictly prefers one candidate, so does a majority of the electorate. It is then enough to focus on the behavior of the median voter to determine electoral outcomes. We will do so in what follows and often refer to the median voter simply as the voter. Our next result describes the e¤ect of the expert's message m e on voting behavior.
If m e in ‡uences voting, it can only reveal the platform the expert prefers, i.e., whether y > x mid b e or y < x mid b e ; and the platform the expert prefers is elected. The message m e is in ‡uential i¤
When m e is not in ‡uential, the platform closest to E[y] is elected regardless of m e . Lemma 2 is a standard result for binary action cheap talk games. When the message m e in ‡uences voting behavior, the expert has an incentive to send the message that elects the expert's more favored platform. Voters account for this incentive and so the message m e can only convey the expert's preferences to the voter, i.e., whether or not y + b e > x mid .
The message m e is in ‡uential if the (median) voter has an incentive to follow the expert's advice. Since b e > 0, whenever the expert endorses the left platform x L , the voter also prefers the left candidate x L . The inequality (2) provides the condition under which the median voter (and so a majority of voters) prefers to follow the expert's endorsement of the right candidate x R . 6 To understand when (2) might hold, de…ne y 2 R to be such that
The state y is a …xed point-the expected value of the true state, given that it is at least y , equals the expert's ideal point y + b e when the state is y . Since y is uniformly distributed on [y l ; y h ], we can solve (3) and obtain
So (5) holds and the expert is in ‡uential and if and only if
The voter is willing to follow the expert's endorsement for the right platform if and only if the "average"platform x mid is not too high. The interval [y l ; y h b e ] is the expert's "zone of in ‡uence".
His endorsement determines the electoral outcome if and only if the average platform lies in this
interval.
We turn now to the determination of equilibrium platform choices. Let v = y h y l measure the uncertainty about the state faced by the general public at the time platforms are chosen.
Proposition 1 shows that this uncertainty is a key determinant of equilibrium platforms.
In equilibrium the two parties choose a common policy platform, x L = x R = x given by:
if v 2b e (voter pandering)
Platform convergence occurs in this model for essentially the same reason as in the classical median voter theorem. Suppose x L 6 = x R . If the expert's endorsement is in ‡uential, the party which is winning with probability less than 1 2 can gain by matching its platform with the other message me and so the expert can do no better than be uninformative. When an in ‡uential equilibrium also exists, it yields higher expected payo¤ to both the expert and the voter (conditional on ma and the platforms). Following the literature, we select the Pareto dominant in ‡uential outcome whenever it exists. In the statement of Lemma 2 we also break ties by assuming that the voter follows the expert's advice when she is indi¤erent. This is in the spirit of selecting the e¢ cient outcome and has no e¤ect on our results. This relationship between uncertainty about the state and the degree of expert (or voter) pandering plays a key role in the analysis of the next section where we allow the expert to also in ‡uence platforms through policy advice. As long as political parties are going to pander to the expert in their platform choices, she has no incentive to withhold information during advice, but that in ‡uence is lost if too much information is revealed at this stage. This trade o¤ is the key determinant of the incentives that determine the expert's equilibrium policy advice. Proposition 1 also identi…es an interesting non-monotonicity in the expert's in ‡uence on policy as a function of her bias. This is depicted by Figure 2 (b) which plots equilibrium platforms as a function of the expert's bias b e for …xed uncertainty about the state. 8 For b e < 1=4, both parties pander to the expert. If the expert's bias increases slightly, equilibrium platforms move further away from what is ideal for the median voter. The voter's welfare is decreasing in the expert's bias in this zone. For b e > 1=4 however, the voter's welfare is increasing in the expert's bias. This is because extremely biased experts struggle to issue credible endorsements, reducing the incentive of political parties to pander to them and reverting platforms closer to the voter's ideal policy.
Experts lose in ‡uence when they desire to change the course of public policy substantially rather than modestly, making such ambitions self-defeating. Overall, experts of intermediate bias exert the most distortionary in ‡uence on policies and impose the most harm on the average voter.
If the expert's public communication is only limited to partisan endorsements, Proposition 1 shows that the welfare e¤ect of an informed expert on a majority of voters is unambiguously negative. There is a potential channel for incorporating expert information into policy choices even with this limited form of communication. However, this requires the creation of a non-trivial menu of policy choices for voters through platform di¤erentiation, with the expert subsequently enabling them to choose "horses for courses" depending on the state-of-the-world. Unfortunately, due to platform convergence in response to electoral incentives, expertise produces no useful information in equilibrium. The expert still exerts a distortionary e¤ect on platforms, which move away from the median voter's expected ideal E[y], due to her ability to in ‡uence choices o¤-the-equilibriumpath. The zero informational bene…t, coupled with a negative platform distortion e¤ect, implies the median voter (and by extension, a majority of voters) su¤ers welfare losses due to the biased expert. Indeed, the median voter's welfare is driven below the level where the expert is banned from issuing endorsements and platforms are chosen without any access to information. In what 8 In Figure 2 follows, we show that this e¤ect of an expert on voter welfare is reversed in most interesting cases when the expert is allowed to provide policy advice in addition to partisan endorsements.
Policy advocacy
We now allow the expert to send the additional public message m a before party platforms are chosen, potentially revealing some information about y. The expert faces a trade-o¤ between making policies more informed and making them more aligned with her own preferences, inevitably leading to some coarsening of information in equilibrium. For instance if the expert perfectly reveals the value of y, the parties will locate at y, the ideal policy of the median voter. This cannot be an equilibrium since the expert then has an incentive to overstate the value of y in order to get policies that are closer to her own ideal policy.
In general, there are multiple equilibria corresponding to di¤erent partitions of the state space informative equilibrium with N (b e ) number of intervals is given by the following: Both parties fully pander to the expert and locate at 8=9, the expected ideal policy of the expert given that the state y lies in this interval.
The most informative equilibrium always has the qualitative features depicted in 
Welfare
What is the social value of representative democracy with o¢ ce seeking career politicians, in our model of multi-stage communication by an expert? What is the social value of expertise? Would a majority of voters be worse o¤ if the expert was absent from the model so that policy choice was guesswork by necessity? Are the welfare e¤ects driven by policy advocacy by the expert or by her partisan endorsements?
To answer these questions, we compare the equilibrium of our model (which we will call rep- as an uncontested winner (Osborne and Slivinski (1996) , Propositions 1 and 2). 9 There are some other plausible scenarios which are outcome equivalent to direct democracy. We discuss these cases further down.
The equilibrium outcome of direct democracy corresponds to that of the Crawford-Sobel (1982, henceforth CS) game of strategic information transmission between a sender (the expert in this case) and a receiver (the median voter). In the CS model, for the uniform-quadratic version that we consider, the equilibrium partition is uneven, with intervals iincreasing by the length 4b e in the direction of bias. In contrast, in our model of representative democracy, the equilibrium partition produces intervals that are more even in size and each interval is at most of length 4b e . So indirect democracy produces a greater number of more evenly sized intervals compared to direct democracy, direct democracy, policies are always optimal for the median voter for each message of the expert. To understand the result, recall that under direct democracy the expert is informative only when b e < 1=4. Since 5=18 > 1=4, Proposition 3 shows that when direct democracy does better, the outcome is equivalent to shutting down communication with the expert. As long as communication reveals any information under direct democracy, the median voter does better under indirect democracy. 10 As noted by Holmstrom (1982) and Dessein (2002) , partial or complete delegation of decision making authority to an informed expert often serves the interest of an uninformed receiver of information. In our model of expert captured democracies, electoral competition serves in e¤ect as a delegation mechanism, albeit an imperfect one. 11 The threat of in ‡uential platform endorsements distorts equilibrium platforms towards what the expert would like. Considered by itself, such expert pandering reduces voter welfare. But it provides voters with some commitment power to delegate platform choice to the expert. This results in the expert providing informative policy advice, raising voter welfare above what would be obtained under direct democracy. The interaction e¤ect of multi-stage communication delivers 1 0 When the median voter prefers indirect democracy, so do a majority of voters. A minority may prefer the alternative institution. However, as long as the mean of the distribution G of voter ideologies equals its mean, the utilitarian sum of voter welfare under indirect democracy is greater than that under direct democracy. 1 1 The delegation bene…ts in our model of indirect capture fall short of the bene…ts of optimal delegation identi…ed by Holmstrom (1982) . In the next section, we consider the possibility of direct capture of a political party by the expert and show that the voter welfare is equal to that under optimal delegation. the welfare gains of indirect democracy. 12 Indirect democracy does not always dominate direct democracy. When the expert is quite biased, b e > 5=18, direct democracy must be better than indirect democracy according to Proposition 3. To understand this, note that when b e > 1=3, the expert provides no information under either direct or indirect democracy. Direct democracy must then be strictly better since it avoids the distortions created by the threat of platform endorsements under indirect democracy. When These two benchmarks identify necessary conditions for the welfare result in Proposition 3.
Consider …rst a scenario where political parties cannot commit to policy platforms. Instead, they can achieve a degree of commitment by nominating candidates with known preferences (captured by their own biases b L and b R ) from the full set of voters. As before, the parties are o¢ ce-seeking and choose a candidate to maximize their probability of winning the election. As before, the expert provides advice before the parties choose candidates and endorsements after they do so.
Subsequently voters vote. The winning candidate chooses a policy to maximize her own payo¤ given all available information. Our next result shows that the equilibrium outcome in this model of candidate commitment (as opposed to platform commitment) yields the same outcome as direct democracy.
Proposition 4 In the model of candidate commitment, both parties choose candidates that are ideologically identical to the median voter, b L = b R = 0 and so the welfare of the voter is identical to that under direct democracy.
Proposition 4 identi…es a necessary condition underlying our main welfare result in Proposition 3. It underscores the bene…ts of programmatic politics over personality centric ones. To reap the delegation bene…ts of indirect democracy, it is important that parties commit through platforms rather than personalities.
We turn now to the second modi…cation of our baseline model. This has to do with the commitment power (or lack thereof) on the part of the expert. So far we have assumed that the expert has no commitment power and engages in cheap talk. The information she can reveal in equilibrium depends entirely on her incentive and credibility constraints. To gain further insight into the comparison between indirect and direct democracy, we now ask how it depends on expert's ability to commit to various kinds of information disclosure policies, reverting back to our baseline assumption that parties commit to platforms.
We begin by considering a particular power of commitment power on the part of the expert.
We suppose that at the ex-ante stage the expert can commit to delegating her messaging to a The incentives of the expert to choose a surrogate is determined by a trade-o¤ between minimizing losses due to coarse information transmission by the surrogate versus losses arising from policies that serve the surrogate's interests and not the expert's. A surrogate who is more closely aligned with the voter and less with the expert will reveal …ner information. This will result in policies that are more …nely tuned to the underlying state of the world. This bene…ts the expert in expected terms. However, these policies will also serve more closely the surrogate's (and voter's) interests and less the expert's interests. This hurts the expert.
The trade-o¤ between better information transmission and more distorted decisions exists both under direct and indirect democracy. However, under direct democracy the bene…t from improving information transmission dominates the cost of more distorted policies. It is in the expert's interest to fully reveal all information to the voter by choosing a surrogate b s = 0 who is perfectly aligned with the voter. The median voter will obtain his ideal, symmetric information payo¤s.
The situation is di¤erent under indirect democracy. Compared with direct democracy, a surrogate with the same bias reveals more precise information at the advocacy stage. As a result, the marginal gain to the expert from choosing a more voter-aligned surrogate and improving information ‡ows falls faster. These gains are dominated by the marginal loss from policies that arise from choosing such a surrogate even when the surrogate is not perfectly aligned with the voter. While the expert may choose a surrogate who is more aligned with the voter than the expert, Proposition 5 shows that she will never …nd it optimal to choose a surrogate who is perfectly aligned with the voter. Under indirect democracy, the optimal surrogate will always have an ideological con ‡ict with the voter.
Although Proposition 5 only considers a particular kind of commitment power on the part of the expert, it shows what will happen if the expert can commit to more general information disclosure policies or persuasion mechanisms (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2011) . It implies that under indirect democracy, the optimal persuasion mechanism must involve noisy information transmission. This follows from observing that even when the expert has limited commitment and can only choose a surrogate with ideology b s , it is feasible for the expert to perfectly reveal all information by choosing a perfectly voter aligned surrogate. But she prefers to choose a surrogate who is not perfectly voter aligned and does not reveal all information.
What happens under direct democracy and expert commitment to persuasion mechanisms?
For our quadratic preference speci…cation, the expert prefers to commit to a policy of revealing all information under direct communication with the median voter. The welfare comparison between indirect and direct democracy described in Proposition 3 therefore depends therefore on the expert's commitment ability. We state this formally as a corollary to Proposition 5.
Corollary 1 Suppose the expert can commit to a persuasion mechanism. Then direct democracy is strictly better than indirect democracy for the median voter Proposition 3 shows that indirect democracy may be better for the voter if the expert is not too biased and engages in cheap talk. Proposition 5 and its corollary shows that lack of commitment on the part of the expert is necessary for such a welfare result to obtain. If the expert can commit to a persuasion mechanism, direct democracy is always strictly better for the voter. Under expert commitment, the voter will obtain her symmetric information outcome under direct democracy but not under indirect democracy.
Direct capture
Our model in Section 2 describes situations where the expert in ‡uences electoral outcomes purely through public communication. She does not directly a¤ect party platforms but nevertheless has signi…cant in ‡uence on electoral outcomes. We now contrast this situation of indirect capture with one where the expert directly controls the platform choices of one (or more) of the political parties. To do so, we revert also to our baseline assumptions that the expert cannot commit to an information disclosure policy and that the parties commit to platforms.
Suppose that one of the two political parties is directly controlled by the expert. The expert chooses this party's platform, possibly as a function of her own private information, in order to Our next result characterizes the best equilibrium for the voter in this signaling game of electoral competition.
Proposition 6
Suppose that the expert with ideology b e > 0 directly chooses the platform of one party, while the other uninformed o¢ ce-seeking party simultaneously chooses its own platform. In the best equilibrium for the voter, the expert's party will choose a platform x e = y + b e in state y, while the uninformed party will choose a platform x u = 1 b e , following which the voter will elect the smaller of the two observed platforms.
In the equilibrium described by Proposition 6, the captured party's platform choice perfectly reveals the state, but the chosen platform is the expert's ideal policy in each state. The voter elects the expert's platform x e as long as it is to the left of the uninformed o¢ ce seeking party's platform
x u . If x e > x u , the voter prefers the uninformed platform and elects it for sure. Figure 5 depicts the platforms and outcomes as a function of the state.
Direct expert capture of one party is quite good for voter welfare. Seen as a mapping from the state y to elected policies, electoral outcomes take the form of a capped delegation mechanism. In fact, it coincides with the optimal mechanism (in the class of all mechanisms without transfers) in our framework (see Holmstrom (1982) ). Direct capture of one party by the expert leads to the best of all possible outcomes for the voter. In particular, it is better than the outcome of indirect capture considered in Section 2. 13 What happens if the expert captures not one but both the political parties? It is easy to see that both parties will propose platforms equal to the expert's ideal policy y + b e in each state and such a policy will be implemented. This corresponds to the notion of full delegation to the expert considered in Dessein (2002) . It can be shown that such complete capture of both parties by the 
Conclusion
We reconsider the Hotelling-Downs model of two party electoral competition in the presence of an ideologically biased but informed expert. The expert can engage in strategic and public information transmission, providing platform endorsements as well as policy advice. Platform endorsements may in ‡uence voters and determine the electoral prospects of o¢ ce-seeking parties. In order to obtain favorable endorsements, parties have an incentive to choose platforms that serves the expert's ideological interests. This by itself hurts voters.
However, expert pandering incentivizes the expert to provide detailed policy advice that allows parties to choose platforms that vary with the information held by the expert. This information dependence bene…ts voters. When the expert is not too ideologically biased, decentralized electoral competition in ‡uenced by the expert yields better average outcomes for voters than directly communicating with the expert and choosing their own ideal policies. Voter welfare is further enhanced if instead of merely engaging in public speech making, the expert directly controls the platforms choices of one (or more) of the parties.
Appendix
General Lemma On any pure strategy equilibrium path of play, the policy advocacy message m a must be an interval of the state space and there must be platform convergence for each such message.
Proof. We show …rst that in any pure strategy equilibrium, the …rst stage message must reveal an interval in which y lies. Note that a policy advocacy strategy is a mapping from the state space we have established that for each y 2 [0; 1], there is a winning policy, which we shall denote by
x (y) and let X be the set of all such winning policies.
We next show that X is a …nite set. Recall that the full information ideal policies of the expert and the median voter are y + b e and y. Now pick two arbitrary winning policies x 0 ; x 00 such that
x 0 < x 00 and let y 0 ; y 00 2 [0; 1] be two states such that x (y 0 ) = x 0 and x (y 00 ) = x 00 . Let % y be the preference relation for the expert in state y. Then, x 0 % y 0 x 00 and x 00 % y 00 x 0 . Since the state space is continuous and % is continuous (given our utility function), there exists a unique indi¤erent type y 2 [0; 1] such that x 0 v y x 00 . It also follows that (a) x 0 < y + b e < x 00 , (b) x 0 is not the induced winning policy for any state y > y as in all such states the expert prefers x 00 and so will deviate; while x 00 is not the induced winning policy for any state y < y as in all such states the expert prefers
x 0 and so will deviate. It is also straightforward to verify from the de…nition of y that x 0 b e < y.
Suppose …rst that y > x 0 . In that case we are done as then from x 0 < y < y + b e < x 00 it follows that x 00 x 0 > b e > 0. So suppose y < x 0 , let " = y + b e x 0 and note that since x 0 < y + b e , we have " > 0. This implies x 00 x 0 > " since y + b e < x 00 . Hence we have shown that there exists > 0 such that for each y 2 [0; 1], we have x 00 x 0 > . Finally, since x (0) and x (1) are bounded, X is a …nite set.
We now prove platform convergence, i.e., we must have x L = x R . Suppose to the contrary that
First consider the case when the expert is not in ‡uential and suppose (x L ; x R ) is an equilibrium pro…le. Then
and
Let p R (x L ; x R ) be the probability of R being endorsed by the expert. Then we can write
But since E[yjy + b < x mid ] 6 = E[y] , we can conclude that p R (x L ; x R ) = 1. Now consider a leftward
This means p R (x L ; x 0 R ) = 1 and if the sender is still not in ‡uential, then R wins with probability 1 since x 0 mid < x mid = E[y]. Hence this is a pro…table deviation for R who was winning with probability 1=2 at the pro…le (x L ; x R ). If the sender becomes in ‡uential at (x L ; x 0 R ), then, given that p R (x L ; x 0 R ) = 1, R wins with probability 1 as well. This shows that if the expert is not in ‡uential, candidate R has a pro…table deviation whenever x L < x R . Finally suppose the expert is in ‡uential and (x L ; x R ) is an equilibrium pro…le. Suppose Y (m a ) is a convex set and x L < x R .
Since the expert is in ‡uential the probability that candidate R wins is Pr[y > x mid b e ] which must equal 1=2. Furthermore,
and when candidate R is endorsed he must win for sure under the observation that an indi¤erent endorsement is a zero probability event. Consider now a leftward deviation by candidate R to x 0 R = x R ", " > 0 and small so that x L < x R ", and let x 0 mid < x mid be the new mid-point. If the prior on the state is log-concave (as we suppose), it follows that the expert is still in ‡uential and the probability of winning the election via an in ‡uential endorsement has strictly gone up for candidate R, a contradiction with equilibrium.
So, suppose the expert is not in ‡uential. Since we are in an equilibrium, the median voter must randomize, implying E[y] = x mid . Consider here a small deviation by candidate R left to
x 0 R = x R " , " > 0 and small so that x 0 mid < x mid be the new mid-point. Then
Furthermore, since " is small, x 0 mid 2 (y l ; y h ) so that an in ‡uential equilibrium exists that we select. Thus, the probability of winning the election (getting an endorsement) is it must be that for each x 2 X (m a ) we have x L < x < x R . In this case L will …nd it strictly better to migrate to some point x 0 L with x R > x 0 L > y. To see this note that by moving to x 0 L , L will continue to be endorsed at each y 2 Y L (m a ) and must also be endorsed by each y 2 [y; x 0 L ] since otherwise the indi¤erent expert in state y cannot be indi¤erent between x R and the action x 2 X (m a ) that y induces as well.
Proof of Proposition 1 Given the General Lemma above, …x some arbitrary interval m a and let the consequent convergent policy be x L = x R = x . We divide the proof into three claims and note that the proof is provided for any non-atomic prior for the state y.
Claim 1 If y > y med , then x = y med + b e is the unique pure strategy equilibrium platform.
To prove the claim, suppose …rst that x < y med + b e so that x b e < y med < y . Consider a small deviation to the right by a candidate to x R = x + ", " > 0 so that the new policy This completes the proof of the proposition. that yields l i+1 l i = 4b e . Since l i < 2b e this is possible only if l i+1 > 2b e . But then one cannot obtain voter pandering from the interval [c i 1 ; c i ). So suppose the advocacy [c i 1 ; c i ] leads to non-pandered policy given by c i b e . Expert's indi¤erence at state c i then implies
yielding the requirement that l i+1 = 6b e which contradicts with the supposition that the policy advocacy [c i ; c i+1 ) leads to voter pandering. Finally, suppose the interval [c i 1 ; c i ] leads to expert pandering given by c i 1 +c i 2 + b e . Expert's indi¤erence at state c i then implies
yielding the requirement that l i 0 which contradicts with the supposition c i > y l and advocacy is partitional. Hence it must be that c i = y l .
Next 
We know from above that c i+1 c i > 2b e as only the left bordering interval can be so. So suppose 4b e > l i+1 > 2b e . Then x = c i+1 b e so that the indi¤erence equation above yields 4b e = 2l i+1 l i .
But since l i 4b e this is impossible. Hence it must be that that l i+1 4b e . Suppose so. Then the indi¤erence condition yields c i = c i+1 c i 1 2 so that l i = l i+1 . This proves that once we observe expert pandering in some state, it remains so for all states to its right. Moreover, the informational content of all expert pandering states is the same. does not lead to any pandering, voter or expert, that is 2b e < l i < 4b e . By construction, c i < y h . By
Part (1), it follows that the interval [c i ; c i+1 ) can either be no pandering or expert pandering since it is not the left bordering interval. Suppose it is a no-pandering interval. Then the indi¤erence of the expert at state c i yields
from which it follows that l i+1 = 4b e . Hence two successive intervals cannot lead to no-pandering.
Hence the interval [c i ; c i+1 ) must lead to expert pandering.
We will now prove the following: Fix and arbitrary interval [y l ; y h ] of the state space and let R be the remainder when 4b e divides l = y h y l . The most informative equilibrium is a unique Nelement interval partition of the state space with the following properties: Consider an N -element equilibrium partition of the state space [y l ; y h ] and denote by l i as the 'length' of the i -th element of this partition, i = 1; : : : ; N . Let y h y l = l. Our objective here is to …nd N (b e ; l), the maximum value of N , such that (given the results on policy advice) the following constraints are met: (i) If an interval is of length not more than 2b e then it must be the left-most interval, (ii) if an interval is of length no less than 4b e then all intervals to its right must be of equal lengths and (iii) there cannot be two successive intervals whose lengths are each bigger than 2b e and less than 4b e .
Part (1): Assume on the contrary that l 3b e and there exists an informative equilibrium. Part (3): Let R be the remainder when 4b e divides l = y h y l . The proof is by construction.
Since l > 4b e it follows that R > 0. When R > 3b e , we produce 1 R 4be intervals of size 4b e from the right and apply Part (2) Proof of Lemma ?? We now prove that the expert and the median voter have identical preference rankings over the equilibrium set where the most informative equilibrium yields the highest ex-ante payo¤. To prove this we employ the following steps. ; 1]g be two equilibrium partitions such that l i and l 0 j are each greater or equal to 4b e :
The median voter and the expert strictly prefer P 3 to P 4 i¤ N > N 0 .
The expected utility of any agent with bias 0 from partitions P 3 and P 4 are given by
Also, Recall that the loss to the median voter from a N = 2 element CS equilibrium is
where l i = l 1 + 4b e (i 1); i 2 (8) and P N i=1 l i = 1. Using (8) in (7) and dropping all terms involving l 1 = 0, we have
On the other hand, the loss to the median voter from the most informative equilibrium in our model, L CGR , is strictly less than the loss from the M -partition equilibrium where each interval is of equal length, of at least size 4b e , so that there is complete expert pandering in each interval.
In other words,
where M = b 1 4be c and each interval is of length 1=M . Therefore, to show L CS > L CGR for all b e 1=24, it su¢ ces to show 64b 3 e N (N 1) 2
We have left quite a bit of slack but we show below that for b e 1=24 we can a¤ord this slack.
Note since b e 1=24, we have N 4 and M 6. Call b (N ) = 1 2N (N 1) the cuto¤ at which the N element CS equilibrium is born, i.e., at b e = b (N ), l 1 = 0 so that l 2 = 4b e , l 3 = 8b e , and so on, i.e., all CS intervals have lengths that are multiples of 4b e . At this value of b e we must have M = N (N 1) 2 = 1=4b e in the equal length equilibrium in our model with M elements with each interval of length exactly 4b e . In this case (9) becomes Notice now that starting from b (N ), as we lower b e slightly, N and M remain …xed in (9) . We now introduce further slack in our analysis by proving that the lower bound on the most informative CS equilibrium loss provided in the LHS of (9) is greater than the loss from the M element equal length equilibrium of the full model (which is not even the most informative equallength equilibrium). More precisely, we now establish the following su¢ cient condition: Note also that the di¤erence between the LHS and RHS of (10) 
The derivative of the lHS of (11) in N can be veri…ed to be
which is positive for N 4. As a result if (11) obtains at some N it also obtains for all larger N .
To complete the proof it can be veri…ed that (11) obtains at N = 4. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose the two parties have committed to candidates with ideologies b L and b R . Fix the …rst stage message m a and the second stage message m e . The median voter (and hence a majority) will strictly prefer to elect the candidate who is ideologically closest to the median voter since such a candidate will choose policies that are closest to what the median voter likes given all available information. So such a candidate will win the election for sure, regardless of the information revealed by the expert. It follows that is in the incentive of each o¢ ce-seeking party to choose a candidate that is identical in his ideology to the median voter.
Proof of Proposition 5: We provide only a proof for the case with indirect democracy since the result under direct democracy (the CS model) is well known.
Suppose the expert (with bias b e > 0) commits to disclose her information to a surrogate with bias b s > 0 before the game of electoral competition starts. Subsequently, the surrogate takes the role of the expert in the game summarized in Figure ? ?. The loss to the expert from a N -message equilibrium with the surrogate b s is
where l i = length of ith interval and b y i = "action" in the ith interval. Let y i = expected value of y given it is in i th interval and let i = b y i y i = "distortion" in the action from what the voter would like. We can write
The expected loss to the expert from choosing a voter aligned surrogate, i.e., b s = 0, is b 2 e . So the di¤erence in the loss between full disclosure to the voter and choosing a surrogate with bias b s > 0 is
To show that b s = 0 is not optimal it su¢ ces to …nd some b s and associated N for which > 0.
We pick a N partition equilibrium where a N + 1 equilibrium is "just born" for some N > 1. In this equilibrium, the left most interval is of length 3b d (with partial pandering) and every other interval is of length 4b d (with surrogate pandering). We have the following relationships in such an equilibrium: Using these, we obtain
As long as b s 6 = 0, > 0 i¤ the term in braces above is strictly positive. Furthermore, for …xed b e , as b s becomes small 8(N 1)b e becomes arbitrarily large and so the term inside braces must be positive for b s small enough. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6.
We need to show that the following pro…le of strategies is an equilibrium. The expert (captured party) chooses a platform x u = y + b e as a function of y while the uninformed o¢ ce-seeking party chooses a platform x u = 1 b e . Notice that x e 2 [b e ; 1 + b e ]. Let x e denote a generic platform choice by the expert's party and x u a generic platform choice by the uninformed party.
First consider the voter's sequential rationality in this candidate equilibrium. When x e = 2
[b e ; 1 + b e ], the voter's beliefs are free. We choose beliefs that allow the voter elect the uninformed platform for sure in this case. Otherwise, the voter infers y = x e b e and elects the platform closest to this inferred state, randomizing if indi¤erent in manner to be speci…ed below. Notice that if the two parties behave as speci…ed, the voter elects min[x e ; x u ].
Consider now the expert party's rationality. If it behaves as speci…ed, then for all y < x u b e , we get x e = x e = y + b e < x u and so the voter elects x u . Since this is the ideal policy of the expert in these states, there is no pro…table deviation for the expert in such cases. On the other hand, if y + b e x u , and the expert chooses x e = x e = y + b e , the voter's loss from electing the expert's platform is b e while her loss from electing the uninformed platform is at most b e . So the voter weakly prefers to elect the uninformed platform (and we suppose that the voter elects the uninformed platform when indi¤erent). If the expert deviates to any other platform x e < x u , and in the interval [b e ; 1 + b e ], in these states, then the voter infers y = x e b e < x e < x u and elects the expert's platform. But since y + b e > x u , this outcome is worse for the expert than letting x u get elected. So such a deviation is unpro…table for the expert. On the other hand, if the expert deviates to some x e = 2 [b e ; 1 + b e ], then voter beliefs are free and the voter still elects x u so such a deviation is not pro…table for the expert either. We conclude that the expert's behavior is sequentially rational in all states y.
Next consider the uninformed o¢ ce-seeking party's rationality. If it behaves as speci…ed, it wins the election when x e = y + b e x u which occurs with probability 2b e .By deviating to any other platform x u , it can win only the voter's loss from electing x u is at most b e , the loss from electing x e , i.e., only when y 2 [x u b e ; x u + b e ] which occurs with probability at most 2b e . So the uninformed party does not have a pro…table deviation from its prescribed platform.
